Introduction
Belief revision is the process of revising a knowledge base to be consistent with new information. Belief revision is trivial when new information is consistent with old information. The diculty occurs when new information contradicts current beliefs. In this case it is necessary to remove or modify certain beliefs in order to make previous knowledge consistent with the new information being added.
A key diculty in belief revision is deciding which beliefs should be maintained and which modied in the face of contradictory information. When an agent believes that \Socrates is a man" and \All men are mortal", how should it modify its beliefs when it is told that \Socrates is immortal"? Should the agent believe that Socrates was not a man? that all men are not mortal? or that Socrates is mortal despite being told otherwise? Logically, all three are possible; the question is which one to choose. This paper discusses several approaches to belief revision taken in the AI literature. Work in belief revision is scattered across many subelds of AI. We will examine FORTE and PTR from the machine learning community [Richards and Mooney, 1993 , Feldman et al., 1993 , Feldman, 1993 , GDE from the diagnosis community [de Kleer and Williams, 1992] , and theoretical work from the knowledge representation community [Nebel, 1989] .
The discussion will focus on integrating ideas from these diverse systems into an existing intelligent agent. Rodney is an intelligent agent that performs tasks within the Unix operating system [Etzioni et al., 1992] . The belief revision problem is important for Rodney because the rapidly changing Unix environment causes Rodney to acquire information that is inconsistent with its beliefs.
The next section explains why the belief revision problem is important for Rodney. Section 3 denes the belief revision problem. Section 4 presents a unied view of the revision process that will be used in Section 5 to discuss existing systems. Section 6 shows how the ideas from existing systems can be used for belief revision in Rodney.
Motivation
Softbots or software robots are intelligent agents that operate in a software environment [Etzioni and Segal, 1992] . Software environments are interesting because they provide a real world environment for building complete intelligent agents without having to deal with the complexity of robotic hardware. Real world environments prevent many of the simplications and assumptions that have plagued previous AI research.
Two often made assumptions are that the knowledge used by planning and inference systems is complete and correct. Rodney cannot make these assumptions. Complete knowledge in the Unix domain would, for instance, require that the location of every le on the Internet be known. Correctness is impossible because the Unix environment continuously changes. What is correct at one moment can be incorrect in the next.
Two planning systems, Ishmael and UCPOP-XII, have been developed for Rodney that remove the completeness requirement [Lesh, 1992 , Golden, 1993 . Each of these systems adds the ability to plan with sensory actions. A sensory action is an action that acquires information about the agent's environment. Sensory actions remove the completeness requirement because they enable information missing during planning to be obtained.
Dropping the correctness assumption is more problematic. Any system that can both hold incorrect information and acquire new information has the possibility of having inconsistent beliefs. Belief revision becomes necessary to make the knowledge base consistent.
Neither Ishmael nor UCPOP-XII properly deal with incorrect information. If an action fails because of incorrect information, these planners will try another action instead of determining why the current action failed. Without eliminating the incorrect belief, Rodney may fail to nd a plan where one might otherwise exist. An action failing when its preconditions are believed to be met can be viewed as an inconsistency that can be resolved using belief revision techniques.
Handling incorrect information can give rise to the belief revision problem in another way. Sensory actions may assert new information that contradicts previous beliefs. Since Rodney currently does not support inference, Rodney can handle this situation by replacing the old belief. When inference is added to Rodney, this simple solution is no longer possible since the incorrect belief may be supported in a multitude of ways. Full belief revision will be necessary to make Rodney's knowledge base consistent with the newly sensed information.
As discussed in the next section, belief revision is more than the modication of a knowledge base to be consistent with new information. Belief revision includes generalizing a knowledge base to explain new information. This aspect of belief revision makes it possible to use new information to improve the current knowledge base. As we work towards adding learning capabilities to Rodney, this will become an increasingly important feature to include.
Problem Denition
Belief revision is the process of modifying a knowledge base to be consistent with new information. This denition, although essentially correct, allows the knowledge base to be modied in arbitrary ways. A better denition should constrain the modications allowed. The following is an improved denition:
Given a theory A, a new fact x, and a correct theory 2, nd a new theory A 0 such that:
1. (correctness) The rst two criteria state that the modied theory should both contain the new fact and be consistent. The third criterion states that any belief removed from the original theory must not be in the correct theory. The correctness criterion prevents beliefs that were both previously believed and correct from being removed from the knowledge base. The correctness criterion is actually more powerful in real belief revision systems because the correct theory will not be available for inspection. Instead, real systems must prove a fact is not a member of the correct theory before it can justify its removal. The correctness criterion insures that previously held beliefs that are still plausible are maintained. Correctness is often unobtainable in real systems since the information needed to prove a belief incorrect is unavailable. Real systems however can approximate this ideal by choosing modications that are likely to be correct.
Many of the reviewed systems actually address a stronger version of the belief revision problem. The stronger denition requires that new information be explainable using previously held beliefs. In the stronger denition, systems must use new information to improve existing beliefs about how the world behaves.
An observable is any predicate whose truth or falsity can only be determined using sensory actions. A concept is any predicate which is denable in terms of observables and other predicates via implication. The denition of a concept does not preclude the existence of sensory actions for determining whether the concept's predicate holds. We now dene strong belief revision.
Strong Belief Revision:
1. (completeness) The completeness criterion adds the requirement that the new theory can derive any new instance of a concept without the instance being known. The correctness criterion had to be modied to allow potentially incorrect rules to be generalized. A generalized rule logically entails its original form, so in some sense generalizing a rule does not remove a rule from the knowledge base. The modied correctness criterion does not require a removed rule to be correct if it is entailed by the new theory.
Revising Beliefs
Belief revision is essentially a three-step process. First, inconsistencies in the knowledge base must be detected. Second, one of the inconsistent beliefs must be chosen for modication. Finally, a decision must be made about how the belief should be modied. A fourth step is added for strong belief revision. The fourth step augments the knowledge base to entail the fact being added. This section will describe the steps of belief revision in detail. We will use the knowledge base in Figure 1 as an example. The knowledge base contains an incorrect model for cups and several example objects. Currently the knowledge base incorrectly entails cup(object-1). The following sections describe how the knowledge base should be revised when :cup(object-1) is added.
Detecting Conicts
The rst step is to determine if the new fact conicts with any previous beliefs. If there are no conicts, the new fact can be added to the knowledge base without further complication. A conict is a set of beliefs that entail the negation of the fact being added. It is necessary to remove at least one member of every conict from the knowledge base to achieve consistency. Since every superset of a conict is also a conict, we will primarily be interested in minimal conicts.
For every proof of the new fact's negation, there exists a conict between the beliefs used within the proof. Figure 2 presents one of the two proofs of cup(object-1) that exists and shows its corresponding conict. If any of the beliefs in the conict for this proof were removed, the proof would fail. If a belief used in the other proof was also removed, the knowledge base would be consistent with :cup(object-1).
It is necessary to determine all conicts because every conict must be eliminated to achieve consistency. One approach used by EITHER [Ourston and Mooney, 1993] and GDE is exhaustively searching through all proofs of the new facts negation and recording each proof's conict set. GDE reduces the amount of search required by using an ATMS [de Kleer, 1986 ] to cache results of repeated calculations. An ATMS can greatly reduce the cost of computing all proofs of a proposition, de Kleer claims his ATMS can handle a knowledge base with one thousand beliefs eciently [de Kleer, 1986] .
What about knowledge bases with tens of thousands of beliefs? Recent work in expert systems and common sense reasoning has made knowledge bases of this size a reality. Murray and Porter suggests that very large databases can be handled by dividing the knowledge base into coherent subtheories called views [Murray and Porter, 1989] . Views can be used to limit the search for inconsistencies to related facts in the same view. Views do not, however, guarantee that new information is consistent with facts in other views.
Doyle's TMS uses a technique that makes complete searches for inconsistencies unnecessary [Doyle, 1979] . Doyle's TMS does not attempt to nd inconsistencies when they are introduced but instead waits for them to be detected during normal inference. Since inconsistencies are not a problem until they are used in deductions, it is not strictly necessary to detect them when they are introduced. However, there are advantages to detecting conicts near their introduction. Early detection prevents choosing actions and making decisions based on the incorrect belief causing the inconsistency. Furthermore, the easiest time to resolve conicts is usually when they are rst introduced. Lazy detection is still useful as a fallback measure for systems that use an incomplete mechanism for early detection. For instance, a system might use views for an immediate consistency check but rely on lazy
has(X,concavity)^upward-pointing-concavity(X) has(object-1,bottom) flat-bottom(object-1)
:width(object-1, small) ceramic(object-1) lightweight(object-1) has(object-1, concavity) upward-pointing-cavity(object-1) has(object-2, bottom) flat-bottom(object-2) width-small(object-2) ceramic(object-2) lightweight(object-2) has(object-2, concavity) upward-pointing-cavity(object-2) cup(object-2) has(object-3, bottom) flat-bottom(object-3) width-small(object-3) styrofoam(object-3)
:lightweight(object-3) has(object-2, concavity) upward-pointing-cavity(object-3)
:cup(object-3)
has(object-4, bottom) flat-bottom(object-4) width-small(object-4) styrofoam(object-4) lightweight(object-4) has(object-2, concavity) upward-pointing-cavity(object-4) Figure 1 : An example knowledge base containing an incorrect cup theory and information about several objects. The cup theory incorrectly entails cup(object-1), making belief revision necessary when :cup(object-1) is added to the knowledge base. Other objects in the system can be used to help determine which modication should be made.
has(object−1,bottom) flat−bottom(object−1) ceramic(object−1)
has(X,concavity)^upward-pointing-concavity(X), has(object-1,bottom), flat-bottom(object-1), :width(object-1, small), ceramic(object-1), lightweight(object-1), has(object-1, concavity), upward-pointing-cavity(object-1) g Figure 2 : Since :cup(object-1) is known, the above proof of cup(object-1) makes the knowledge base inconsistent. At least one of the beliefs used in the proof must be incorrect, thus they form a conict.
detection for anything missed.
Candidate Selection
A candidate is a minimum set of beliefs which if removed will make the knowledge base consistent. A candidate must contain at least one belief from all known conicts. There are generally a large number of possible candidates, but only a small subset of them will be justied. A justied candidate is one whose beliefs are known to be incorrect. . If a belief is found to be accurate, all candidates that contain that belief can be removed from consideration. If a belief is found to be false, only candidates containing that belief need to be considered. If one belief from each conict can be shown incorrect, a justied candidate has been found.
Sensory actions may not exist to verify every belief needed. Without the ability to verify all beliefs, it is impossible to nd a justied candidate. One of the remaining candidates must be used to modify the knowledge base. A good way to choose among the remaining candidates is to select the candidate which is most likely justied. GDE uses the probability that individual beliefs are correct to calculate the probability a candidate is justied. By calculating the likelihood of each candidate, GDE can determine the most likely candidate. This calculation can be costly because the number of candidates grows exponentially in the number of conicts. A good approximation is to use best-rst search and to stop when a candidate is found that meets some preassigned threshold.
The probability information can be improved by considering how often beliefs are used within the knowledge base. For instance, if the rule for stable has been used many times to correctly predict cups, then it is more likely to be accurate than a rule that has yet to be used. PTR uses multiple invocations of a rule to boost the condence that a given rule is correct. However, PTR uses a dierent approach to choosing candidates. In PTR, a belief is modied only when the probability of it being incorrect reaches a threshold. Thus the members of the chosen candidate are chosen one at a time as enough evidence is received to conrm each member. The disadvantage to this approach is the system leaves itself in an inconsistent state until the time it has enough information to select a modication.
The least robust technique for choosing a candidate is to select the candidate that requires the fewest modications to the original theory. When all beliefs are assumed to have equal but small probabilities of being incorrect, the smallest candidate is actually the most probable . Finding a minimum candidate that has one example from each conict is equivalent to nding a minimum set covering. The minimum set covering problem is known to be NP-hard but can be approximated using a greedy algorithm that is within a logarithmic factor of optimal.
Modifying Beliefs
Once a candidate is selected, it is necessary to remove or modify each of the beliefs in the candidate to prevent the conicting proofs that depend on them from working. Removing all beliefs in a candidate is the simplest way to insure no conicts occur, but it has the cost of removing potentially useful information. Suppose the following candidate was selected to revise the cup theory: fgraspable(X) ceramic(X), graspable(X) upward-pointing-cavity(X)g Both rules could be removed, but doing so eliminates some possibly useful information about being graspable.
Another alternative is to modify the rules so that they do not apply in the situations in which they conict. A rule can be modied by adding additional antecedents that prevent it from applying in conicting proofs. By adding antecedents, the original structure of the rule is not lost.
Inductive learning algorithms can be used to add antecedents to rules. For example, FOIL is an inductive algorithm for learning rst-order horn theories [Quinlan, 1990] . FOIL builds clauses by greedily adding to a clause one antecedent at a time. FOIL's main loop can be used to greedily add antecedents to an existing rule. Since FOIL is an inductive learning algorithm, it needs training examples to guide the induction process. A training example is any set of objects for which the truth of the rule's consequent is known and the predicates those objects are known to satisfy. In the cup example, object-1, object-2 and object-3 can be used as training examples for cup(X) by collecting all predicates relevant to them. FOIL adds antecedents until all negative examples are not provable. Adding antecedents can also prevent the proof of positive examples; FOIL therefore attempts to minimize the number of positive proofs invalidated. Since all proofs of negative examples are eliminated, all conicts in which the rule participates become consistent.
Generalizing Beliefs
Strong belief revision requires generalizing the knowledge base to explain new information. The strong version of belief revision encourages agents to learn what it does not know. For example, consider the statement cup(object-4) been added to the cup knowledge base. Currently the knowledge base does not have enough information to identify object-4 as a cup without having being told that it was. Strong belief revision requires the knowledge base to be modied to include an explanation of why object-4 is a cup.
There are four possible reasons for a knowledge base to be unable explain new information. One reason is the new fact is an observable. Observables are facts that are not derivable from other facts. It is not necessary to attempt to nd an explanation for observables because none exists.
A second reason for failing to explain a fact is to have incorrect or incomplete information about facts that are used within what otherwise would be the correct proof. For instance, if width(object-2, small) were negated or non-existent in the cup knowledge base it would not be possible to prove object-2 was a cup. The systems reviewed that perform generalization assume all facts needed for an explanation are available and correct.
Another reason for failure is that the rules for proving the fact are incorrect and need modication. Typically, belief revision systems modify rules to entail new information by removing antecedents from rules. Removing an antecedent from a rule causes the rule to apply in more circumstances. Which antecedents to remove is based on which will allow the new information to be explained and on which do well on other known examples of the rule's consequent. A generalized rule should not be able to explain any known negative example because if it did, it would be inconsistent with that example.
A technique similar to that used to detect conicts can be used to determine which antecedents to remove. All possible proofs of the new fact are considered, and the antecedents that are false and therefore cause each proof to fail are recorded. If each antecedent from a failed proof was removed from its respective rule, the proof would become a valid proof of the new fact. There is a choice as to which set of antecedents to remove. The antecedents to remove are usually selected by nding the minimum set of antecedents that when modied are consistent with all known examples of the rule's consequent. An ATMS can be used to improve the eciency of generating all partial proofs, but lazy evaluation like used for conicts cannot be applied. Fortunately, nding all proofs is not strictly necessary because xing a single partial proof is sucient to insure a new fact is derivable.
The nal way the theory can fail is when a rule is missing from the knowledge base. A learning algorithm such as FOIL can be used to nd a new rule or set of rules that can derive the new example. The new rules learned should be chosen as to enable one of the partial proofs of the new fact to succeed. Again, a heuristic is used to decide which predicates to attempt to x. These two approaches can be combined to allow some predicates to be xed by removing antecedents and others to be xed by learning new rules.
5 Case Studies 5.1 FORTE FORTE is a rst-order concept learning system that learns new concepts using belief revision. The goal of concept learning is to nd an operational denition of a concept using positive and negative instances of the concept being learned. First-order concept learning attempts to nd, for a given predicate, a set of rules that predict when the predicate will hold. A set of rules for a concept is called a theory.
Early concept learning systems were not able to use existing knowledge to guide the learning process. FORTE combines concept learning and belief revision to learn concepts when a partial theory for the concept is available. FORTE starts with a partial, possibly faulty theory for the concept to be learned and a set of positive and negative instances of the concept. FORTE attempts to revise the knowledge base so that it predicts every positive example and does not predict any of the negative examples. FORTE can be considered a belief revision system that removes inconsistencies introduced by negative examples and that nds explanations for positive examples.
There are several aspects of concept learning that dier from standard belief revision as described earlier. FORTE assumes that each example is correct, and thus all revisions will be made to the concept's theory. In addition, all examples are presented to FORTE at once. This can be modeled in our formal denition of belief revision as having a single conjunction being added to the knowledge base consisting of the facts for each example.
Algorithm
The basic FORTE algorithm is shown in Figure 3 . A revision point is any theory element whose revision could improve the theory's performance on the training examples. FORTE distinguishes two types of revision points, those for generalization and those for specialization. A specialization point is a theory element that can be specialized to prevent proofs of negative examples. A generalization point is a theory that can be generalized to provide proofs of positive examples. FORTE nds all revision points by considering all possible proofs for all examples.
Revision points can be explained with an expanded denition of candidate. Previously a candidate was dened as a set of beliefs that when appropriately modied eliminates all conicts. The expanded notion of a candidate is the set of all beliefs that when appropriately modied will eliminate all conicts and provide proofs for all positive examples. A revision point is any theory element which might appear in the best candidate.
FORTE uses a greedy algorithm to select the best candidate. The greedy algorithm works by successively adding to the selected candidate the best revision point. The best revision point is the revision point whose revision results in the theory with the best performance on the training examples. Several revision operators are considered for each revision point. The operators considered depends on whether the revision point is marked for specialization, generalization, or both. In the latter case, operators for both specializing and generalizing are considered.
FORTE supports three specialization operators: deleting a rule, inductively adding antecedents using FOIL, and relational pathnding. The rst two were described earlier, so here we concentrate on relational pathnding. Relational pathnding is an inductive algorithm designed to avoid the local maxima problem encountered by FOIL. A sample relational graph is shown in Figure 4 . Each node of the graph represents a constant in the knowledge base. Two constants are connected by an edge if the named relation holds between them. A relational path is simply a path between two nodes.
Relational pathnding seeks to nd short paths between constants that can be used to dene new rules. Consider learning a denition for the grandparent relation from the example grandparent(Christopher, Colin). The shortest path between Christopher and Colin is highlighted in Figure 4 . When the constants in the shortest path are replaced with unique variables, the following correct denition of grandparent is found:
Relational pathnding is superior to FOIL for learning relational paths but suers when non-relational denitions are needed. The problem can be reduced by combining the two techniques for learning denitions that are partially relational. An example of a partially relational predicate is the grandfather relation. Using the example grandfather(Christopher, Colin), relational pathnding will nd the exact same denition as presented above. In addition to being your parents' parent, a grandfather must also be male. The problem is xed by using FOIL to add male(X) to the grandfather clause. FORTE supports four dierent generalization operators: deleting antecedents, adding new rules, and two inverse resolution operators. Antecedent deletion is straight forward; antecedents are removed until the best performance on the training examples is achieved.
The problem with antecedent deletion is deleting antecedents may convert a rule that is too specialized to one that is too general. FORTE's add rule operator addresses this problem by generalizing the rule after antecedents are removed using either FOIL or relational pathnding. The resulting rule or set of rules is guaranteed to be consistent with all training examples.
Two inverse resolution operators, operator identication and absorption, are also used to generalize theories. Inverting the resolution process was rst used in Duce [Muggleton, 1987] as a mechanism for improving incorrect theories. Duce uses inverse resolution to propose improvements to an oracle, the oracle deciding which modications were actually useful. Although Duce is not a belief revision system as we have dened, inverse resolution operators are still applicable.
Operator identication creates a new rule for a clause. The new rule is constructed from two similar rules which are assumed to be derived from each other. Consider the following two rules from a family relationship database:
gender(A, male)^aunt uncle(A, B). uncle (C, D) gender(C, male)^sibling(C, E)^parent(E, D).
Aunt-uncle is intended to be a gender neutral denition of the aunt and uncle relationship. If it is assumed the second clause was derived from the rst, the following rule must be correct:
aunt uncle(C, D) sibling(C, E)^parent(E, D).
Operator identication inverts the resolution process by deriving the rule for aunt uncle from the previous two rules. Operator identication works on a pair of rules which partially unify such that the rst rule only fails to unify on one antecedent. The one non-unied antecedent of the rst rule becomes the head of the new clause. The non-unied parts of the second clause become the antecedents of the new clause. Absorption reverses the process of identication. From the following two rules:
male)^sibling(C, E)^parent(E, D). aunt uncle(C, D) sibling(C, E)^parent(E, D).
Absorption generates the following new rule:
uncle(A, B) gender(A, male)^aunt uncle(A, B).
Absorption can be applied whenever a subset of a rule's antecedents unify with all the antecedents of another rule. In this case, the antecedent subset of the original rule is replaced with the consequent of the matching rule. When there is more than one rule for the consequent of the matching rule, the newly derived rule is a generalization.
Discussion
FORTE's predecessor EITHER was one of the rst systems to handle all aspects of belief revision using the model presented in Section 4. GDE, as will be described, does not modify its beliefs after a candidate is selected. KBANN [Towell et al., 1990] and RTLS [Ginsberg, 1988a , Ginsberg, 1988b , Ginsberg, 1990 ] rst convert the knowledge base to another representation before revising it.
EITHER however can only revise propositional theories. The importance of FORTE is extending EITHER's model of belief revision to handle rst-order horn theories. It is interesting to note what aspects of EITHER were changed in creating FORTE. The most notable change from EITHER to FORTE is in how candidates are selected. In EITHER, the smallest candidate was selected for each inconsistent example. Instead, FORTE uses all examples to determine the modication that is most likely a member of the correct candidate. FORTE's approach has the advantage of using all examples in guiding the choice of a candidate. It is also more ecient because it chooses members of the best candidate one at a time.
FORTE is limited in at least two ways. FORTE cannot use queries to narrow down the choice of the correct candidate, forcing it to choose a candidate without enough information. Second, FORTE assumes the facts within an example are correct. Future work should concentrate on removing these limitations.
PTR
PTR was designed as a system to learn rst-order horn theories using belief revision 2 . PTR's algorithm is almost identical to that of FORTE, diering in how the next revision to make is selected. PTR uses multiple examples to estimate the probability that a given revision point needs to be revised. A revision point is revised if its likelihood of needing revision reaches some threshold.
Algorithm
PTR represents rst-order horn theories using a dt-graph. A dt-graph contains one node for every clause, antecedent, and consequent. Literal edges attach every clause to its antecedents and clause edges attach every clause to its consequent. A sample dt-graph is shown in Figure  5 . For an edge e, we will write p(e) for its parent edge, c(e) for its child edges, and n(e) for the node pointed to by the edge.
Each edge is given a certainty factor. An edge's certainty factor is the probability P (e) that the edge appears in the correct theory. PTR denes an edge's probability formally as P (e) = P (e 2 g(2)) where g(2) denotes the dt-graph of the correct theory. The basic contribution of PTR is an algorithm for updating certainty factors when it is presented with
Figure 5: A sample dt-graph.
an example. An example E is an instance of the top-level predicate combined with the facts form which it can be derived. Certainty factors are updated using a three-step process. The rst step calculates the probability the top-level node is proven by propagating probabilities up the dt-graph. First, the leaves of the dt-graph are assigned values:
( 1 if the literal of e is in E 1 0 P (e) otherwise The dt-graph is lled in bottom up using the following:
The value of (1) at the top-level is the probability that the example E can be proved.
The next two steps are used to update the certainty factors. First the following intermediary value is computed: (e) = 1 0 (1 0 (e)) 1 (f(e) (f(e)) Then, the certainty factors can be updated: P (ejE) = 1 0 (1 0 P (e)) 1 (e) (e) Feldman proved using an independence assumption that P (ejE) = P (e 2 2jE) when P (ejE) is calculated as above.
Each example presented to PTR is used to update the certainty factors. When an edge in the current dt-graph drops below a threshold, it is unlikely to be in the correct theory and is removed. If a clause edge falls below the threshold, removing it specializes the theory. If a literal edge falls below the threshold, removing it generalizes the theory. An interesting aspect of PTR is that it applies equally well to choosing beliefs for either specialization or generalization.
Instead of removing a clause, PTR considers modifying it by adding antecedents. Similarly, PTR considers generalizing a clause by generating a new rule. The techniques used for both these operations closely parallel the ones used by FORTE. The central dierence is that PTR uses CHAM [Kijsirikul et al., 1991] instead of FOIL to do inductive inference.
Discussion
PTR improves over FORTE by providing a mathematical basis for deciding when a belief should be modied. By only modifying beliefs that are unlikely to be correct, PTR reduces its chances of making an incorrect decision. However, the examples required to determine the correct modication may not be available when the inconsistency is detected. It may be necessary for the knowledge base to be kept in an inconsistent state while awaiting additional examples. This problem is not specic to PTR but to any system which tries to make a justied modication. The advantages of justied modications make handling temporarily inconsistent knowledge basis a problem worth addressing. PTR's model fails to indicate how certainty factors can be updated by querying for more information. GDE however provides a dierent framework for updating probabilities that works only for queries. Future work should attempt to combine these formalisms.
5.3 GDE GDE is not a belief revision system but a system for model-based diagnosis. Model-based diagnosis attempts to diagnose faults in real systems using a model of how the system is to behave. Model-based diagnosis can be applied to belief revision by considering the inconsistent theory a faulty system that must be repaired. When applied in this way, model-based diagnosis can determine where the faulty knowledge base is incorrect and thus suggest candidate beliefs for modication. However, model-based diagnosis does indicate how incorrect beliefs should be modied once detected.
Algorithm
GDE generates all minimum conicts using an ATMS. The conicts are used one at a time to incrementally build the set of minimum candidates. The interesting part of GDE is how it eliminates unjustied candidates. Unjustied candidates are eliminated by posing questions to an oracle. For instance, having an oracle indicate that ceramic(object-1) is true would eliminate any candidate that contained this belief. GDE tries to ask questions that will quickly reduce the size of the candidate space. An optimal querying strategy is a sequence of questions where the expected number of questions to nd a justied candidate is minimal.
GDE approximates an optimal strategy by choosing the question that most reduces the candidate space.
The size of the candidate space is measured by using the information theoretic concept of entropy. The entropy of a candidate set C is dened as:
P (c i ) log P (c i ) P (c i ) denotes the probability that candidate c i is correct. Each query reduces the amount of entropy in the candidate space. The expected entropy after a query with possible outcomes O is:
is the probability that the outcome of the query is o and H o is the entropy remaining if the queries outcome was o. The query which most reduces the size of the search space is the query with the lowest expected entropy. Initial values for the probability of candidate are needed. GDE takes as input the prior probability of each belief being correct. GDE assumes that the correctness of each belief is independent and calculates the probability of a candidate using the following formula:
The probabilities given to GDE are equivalent to those used by PTR.
Discussion
The main importance of GDE for belief revision is its formalization of the candidate selection process. GDE provides a formal basis for updating candidate probabilities after a query and a formal basis for choosing optimal querying strategies. However, GDE does not indicate how additional examples should aect a candidate's probability. The concepts from GDE should be merged with those from PTR to dene a model of how a candidate's probabilities change with both queries and additional examples.
The ideas present in GDE apply directly to softbots without the need of introducing an oracle. The availability of sensory actions in Rodney make it possible to acquire new information without using an oracle. One diculty with this approach is that the results of a sensory actions often depend on existing beliefs. If existing beliefs are incorrect, results of sensory actions may not be reliable. The probability model should be extended to consider the probability of a query's answer being incorrect.
Belief Revision Theory
Belief revision is a complex problem whose solution is generally under-constrained. Theoretic work in belief revision has centered around dening a set of rationality constraints for revision and the eects they have on limiting what revisions should be made. Belief revision theory has centered not around adding a belief to a theory, but removing one. This is known as the belief contraction problem. The belief contraction problem is given a theory A and a fact to retract x, to nd a theory A 0 such that A 0 6 x. We will use A 0 x to denote the contraction of theory A to not include x.
Belief contraction was rst studied at the knowledge level. The knowledge level as dened in [Newell, 1981] is the semantic content of a knowledge base. Knowledge level analyses have the advantage that they ignore syntactic properties of a knowledge base and concern themselves only with the knowledge present.
A knowledge level analysis of belief contraction is done by studying the contraction of deductively closed theories. Deductively closed theories are appropriate for a knowledge level analyses because they explicitly list all facts entailed by the knowledge base, eliminating any syntactic bias present in a non-deductively closed theory. Figure 6 shows the rationality postulates for belief contraction proposed by G ardenfors [G ardenfors, 1982] . The postulates assume the theory being modied is deductively closed. Cn(1) denotes the deductive closure of a theory. Postulates (01) through (06) are straightforward but postulates (07) and (08) need explanation. Postulates (07) and (08) deal with removing conjunctions. A conjunction can be contracted by removing any of its conjuncts from the theory. Postulates (07) and (08) (A 0 x) \ (A 0 y) or A 0 x or A 0 y A precise characterization of revision functions that satisfy the rationality postulates is given in [G ardenfors and Makinson, 1988] . Let A # x denote all maximal subsets of A that are consistent with x. A partial meet contraction function is any revision function of the form: 
Returning from the knowledge level
Deductively closed theories are useful for understanding the contraction process but are impractical for use in real belief revision systems. For contraction theory to apply to real systems, it is necessary to determine how the theory constrains contraction functions on non-deductively closed theories.
Let B be any set of beliefs and let A = Cn(B) be the deductive closure of B. Nebel has shown that the following partial meet contraction function which selects the member of A # x that is maximal with respect to B can be used to dene a contraction function on non-deductively closed theories [Nebel, 1989] The equivalence of B x and a partial meet contraction function using links belief contraction theory to contractions on non-deductively closed theories. Since as dened above is relational, B x satises the rst seven rationality postulates. However, is not transitive and therefore B x does not satisfy postulate (08).
The function B x contracts non-deductively closed theories by asserting the disjunction of all maximal consistent subsets of B. The reason for asserting a disjunction can be understood by considering a single conict. It is impossible for all the facts in the conict to be believed in the contracted knowledge base, and removal of any one them will achieve consistency. Instead of trying to choose which belief to remove, B x modies the knowledge base to believe that one of the facts has been removed without indicating which one. Without the clause (B _ :x), B x would not meet the recovery postulate. The clause works by allowing the original belief base B to be deduced from (B _ :x) when x is added.
A x is not entirely satisfactory since it does not satisfy postulate (08). A new contraction function that satises postulate (08) can be found by modifying to use a transitive comparison function. One approach is to assume a total ordering on individual beliefs and to replace the 6 relation with the following: 
Discussion
Theoretical work on belief contraction can be applied to belief revision using the Levi identity: A + x = (A 0 x) [ x. A diculty in applying this theory to existing systems is that many systems modify beliefs to achieve consistency, thus violating postulate (02). In the following discussion, existing systems are evaluated under the assumption that they only remove beliefs.
Both FORTE and PTR require multiple examples to be presented at once. Adding multiple examples at once can be modeled by adding the conjunction of the examples to the theory in one revision operation. The rst four postulates are trivially satised by both FORTE and PTR. In both systems, all but the top-level fact in each example is assumed to be consistent. Since top-level facts cannot be used as antecedents of other inferences, the only way Cn(x) = C(y) could hold in these systems is if x = y. Postulate (05) therefore holds for both systems. Postulate (06) does not hold for either system. Neither system remembers what facts it removes during a contraction; therefore, when a contracted fact is added back to the system, the previously removed facts cannot be replaced. Postulates (07) and (08) only hold when there is an ordering preference used to choose modications. The ordering preference must be independent of the fact being added. Both systems use the fact being added to estimate which revision is more likely, thus causing postulates (07) and (08) to be violated.
GDE uses queries to reduce the candidate space. The candidate space can be modeled as the disjunction of all possible consistent belief sets. Queries can be modeled by asserting the results of the query in the knowledge base. Logical entailment prevents disjuncts which are inconsistent with the query from being believed in the future. If every disjunct but one is logically consistent, the correct theory can be deduced from the knowledge base. GDE, as modeled above, is equivalent to and thus satises the rst seven rationality postulates 3 . GDE however cannot always narrow down the candidate space to a single element. When this is not possible, GDE selects the most likely candidate as the correct modication. The most likely candidate is dependent on the actual fact being added and thus cannot be used to dene a relational selection function. Therefore, GDE does not satisfy postulates (07) or (08) when it cannot completely reduce the candidate space.
Belief Revision for Rodney
Two design tenets for Rodney are that Rodney should use all available information and it should do the best it can with the information it has. A belief revision system for Rodney should therefore do its best to determine the correct candidate but also must perform well when the correct candidate is unknown. Furthermore, Rodney must use new information to generalize and improve its beliefs about its environment.
Rodney should be able to detect conicts at the time they are introduced, but conict detection should not prevent it from doing work. Rodney should be able to use sensory actions, user queries, and additional examples to reduce the candidate space. Examples can be either from previous experience or directly acquired by Rodney through sensory actions. It will take time to acquire enough information to nd the correct candidate. Rodney should be able to perform other tasks while searching, tasks that may involve the inconsistent parts of the knowledge base.
No existing belief revision system handles all the aspects of belief revision that are expected of Rodney. Most of the ideas needed to build a revision system for Rodney are already present in existing systems, but the ideas need to be brought together. The following paragraphs propose a belief revision system that meet the requirements expected of Rodney.
The rst component of the belief revision system is conict detection. Conict detection can be largely handled by Rodney's current task manager. Rodney's task manager maintains a list of all tasks Rodney is supposed to perform and decides when to attend to each task. Conict detection should be a low priority task will be executed when no more important task is pending. Conicts should be detected by searching the consequences of a new fact for a contradiction. A TMS should be used both to reduce the cost of searching and to reuse deductions made during the search in future problem solving episodes. Since deductions can be reused, time spent in conict detection is not wasted. Conicts missed during the search are not a signicant problem because they can be handled if detected later.
It is desirable to detect conicts close to when they occur because they may lead to inconsistent action and because they are usually easiest to diagnose when they occur. Conict detection can interrupt problem solving by raising the priority of the conict detection task to above that of the task detecting the conict. A control decision has to be made about when and for how long to interrupt the current task for conict detection. The control decision trades o the importance of detecting conicts early and the cost of delaying the task at hand. In general, conict detection may be occurring for many facts at once. Control decisions have to be made to determine which fact to concentrate on at a given moment and when conict detection on a given fact should be considered complete.
Every candidate must resolve every conict in the system. The number of potential candidates is exponential in the number of conicts. In real evolving systems where new conicts are introduced all the time, it is impractical to represent the entire candidate space. Instead, Rodney should keep a list of all beliefs that could be a member of the correct candidate. A probability is associated with each candidate belief that indicates the likelihood it is wrong. As new information arrives, the probabilities are updated. If any candidate belief is proven wrong, it is removed as well as the conicts that use it. If any belief is proven correct, it is removed from the set of candidate beliefs. Since absolute proofs will not always be possible, any candidate which can be shown very likely to be true or very likely to be false will be assumed so and removed accordingly.
It may be the case before enough information arrives to eliminate a conict, another task may require the information in conict. If Rodney has the time, it can increase the priority for candidate elimination so that the conict is eliminated immediately. If there is no time and little cost for being incorrect, Rodney can assume the belief most likely to be incorrect in the conict is in fact wrong and will proceed accordingly. Finally, if there is no time and a high cost for being incorrect, Rodney will not be able to complete the task. Rodney failing in this situation is reasonable.
Candidate elimination is like conict detection in that it should be a low priority background task. Rodney should rst try to use sensory actions to eliminate candidate beliefs. Sensory actions are better than using other examples because sensory actions can be used to prove a candidate belief true or false. The techniques used in GDE are not directly applicable to Rodney since it will not keep the entire candidate set. Instead, Rodney needs to base its decision on individual candidate beliefs. Rodney should choose the candidate belief which is expected to eliminate the most conicts. The number of conicts expected to be eliminated by a belief is P (b) 2 C(b) where P (b) denotes the probability the belief is incorrect and C(b) denotes the number of conicts of which the belief is a member.
Rodney requires the prior probability each belief is incorrect to be given. When no prior probability is available, a reasonably high default probability of correctness should be assigned. Each fact added to the system should update the probabilities of aected beliefs. A belief is aected if it contributes to a new fact's proof or disproof. Using this technique, Rodney automatically uses previous examples of a belief to update its probabilities. Still, candidates can be eliminated by acquiring more examples. Rodney's current goal language cannot express the goal of nding examples for a concept but should be extended so that additional examples for a concept can be found. The search for more examples can be terminated when enough examples are found to eliminate a candidate.
Once a candidate belief is selected, it must be modied to be consistent with current information. The rule should be specialized to achieve consistency but should not invalidate existing proofs for positive examples. Rules should be deleted when they do not participate in existing proofs for positive examples and when there are enough existing proofs to suspect the pattern will hold. Otherwise, rules should be modied by adding antecedents. The antecedents added should invalidate as few existing proofs as possible. A positive example which becomes unprovable should be passed to the generalization component.
Generalization occurs whenever an example cannot be proven using the current knowledge base. Since generalization is not strictly necessary, it is of a lower priority than the previously discussed operations. The lower priority of generalization makes it worthwhile to spend extra time to make good generalizations. For every partial proof of a positive example, there is a set of antecedents that if true would allow the proof to be completed. There are three possibilities for each antecedent: it is incorrect, it is correct but the example is incorrect, and both the antecedent and the example are correct. Before attempting a generalization, it is best to determine whether the example is correct. Any fact within an example that contributes to a proof and has a high enough probability of being incorrect is worth checking. Facts within an example can be checked by using the mechanisms described earlier for checking candidates. If a fact within an example is shown incorrect, the fact should be updated and the partial proofs rechecked. If one of the proofs becomes valid then generalization is complete. Otherwise, the process continues until all questionable facts within an example are checked.
If all facts of an example are shown to be correct, it becomes necessary to generalize the theory. Antecedents should only be removed when their probability of being incorrect is high. Sensory actions and additional examples can be used to determine which antecedents are incorrect. If an antecedent is found to be incorrect, it is removed. If none of the proofs can be made to work by removing incorrect antecedents, new rules must be added. New rules are generated one at a time for the antecedents that prevent proofs for the most positive examples. Generalization stops when the knowledge base entails all positive examples.
Conclusion
Belief revision is necessary for Rodney since Rodney can both acquire new information and hold incorrect beliefs. Building a belief revision system for Rodney is a non-trivial task. We have examined several existing belief revision systems to gain insight into the belief revision process and to understand how a belief revision system can be implemented. Previous work in belief revision has come from diverse communities within the eld of AI and therefore have typically addressed dierent aspects of the same problem. Often where one system was lacking, another system excelled. GDE does a good job of laying out the candidate space and specifying how queries can be used to reduce that space, PTR provides a framework for determining how multiple examples aect the likelihood of a candidate, and FORTE provides the mechanisms necessary to modify beliefs to be consistent with examples. In retrospect, it is dicult to determine how meaningful work on belief revision theory has been to the discussion. Belief revision theory is missing a notion of justied modications, instead suggesting that beliefs be modied according to some xed preference ordering. Justied modications seem inherently better because they attempt to detect which beliefs are actually incorrect. Since justied modications violate the nal two rationality postulates, it seems questionable whether these postulates are appropriate. The belief revision system proposed for Rodney demonstrates how the ideas in each of these systems can be combined into a single design. The proposed system uses a combination of PTR and GDE's techniques for candidate selection and uses FORTE's techniques for modifying beliefs. The proposed system improves on existing systems by using both multiple examples and queries to eliminate candidates, by being able to answer its own queries using sensory actions, and by eliminating assumptions about the correctness of training data.
